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KASTIGAR V. UNITED

STATES

SELF-INCRIMINATION: Choosing a Constitutional
Immunity Standard
Kastigar v. United States'
Congress passed the first American immunity statute in 1857 in
order to help secure evidence for an investigation of corruption in the
House of Representatives. 2 The purpose of that statute and subsequent
immunity statutes has been to satisfy the state's need for information
while guaranteeing the witness the protection of the privilege against
self-incrimination.3 The conflict over what standard will adequately
protect the witness who is compelled to testify has centered around
two types of immunity grants: use immunity and transactional immunity. The 1857 statute provided transactional immunity, which is
absolute immunity from prosecution for crimes arising from any
transaction about which the witness has testified.4 Because this statute
proved to lead to many abuses in the form of immunity baths,- the
statute was repealed in 1862, and Congress passed a statute which
provided for a limited form of use immunity.6 Use immunity provides
the witness with a guarantee that his testimony or other information
derived from that testimony will not be used against him in any
future prosecution;7 the limited form8 of use immunity provided in the
1. 406
2. Act
Amendment
554 (1954);
959 (1968);
DUKE

U.S. 441 (1972).
of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 155. See generally Dixon, Jr., The Fifth
and Federal Immunity Statutes (pts. 1-2), 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 447,
Comment, Immunity Statutes and the Constitution, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
Comment, State Immunity Statutes in Constitutional Perspective, 1968

L.J. 311.

3. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a survey of the privilege see 8
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Corwin, The Supreme
Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 Mlcra. L. REv. 1 (1930);
Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against SelfIncriminationin America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935).
An immunity statute accomplishes this purpose by providing that the witness
may be compelled to testify over a claim of the privilege, but will be provided with
some form of immunity in return. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
4. E.g., United States v. Cropper, 454 F.2d 215, 216 n.1 (5th Cir. 1971).
5. Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice:
Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1572 (1963).
The term "immunity bath" is used to describe the "cleansing" of a witness's
sins which occurs when he frees himself from all dangers of prosecution by testifying
in return for an immunity grant.
6. Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11, 12 Stat. 333.
7. Zicarelli v. New Jersey Comm'n of Investigation, 55 N.J. 249, 261 A.2d 129,
137 (1970), af'd, 406 U.S. 472 (1972). Zicarelli was heard by the Supreme Court
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1862 statute did not protect the witness against derivative use of the
testimony.
The Supreme Court considered the validity of a statute9 which
was similar to the 1862 statute, but which applied to judicial proceedings rather than congressional proceedings, when it was first faced
with the question of which standard provides adequate protection
against self-incrimination in Counselman v. Hitchcock.'° The Court,
holding that a statute which did not provide protection against derivative use of testimony was not constitutionally adequate, stated that a
statute to be valid "must afford absolute immunity against future
prosecution for the offense to which the question relates.""
After Counselman, transactional immunity became the accepted
constitutional standard under the fifth amendment privilege;12 this
standard did not apply to the states because the Court had not yet held
that the privilege against self-incrimination was applicable to the states
in conjunction with Kastigar and is discussed infra at p. 301. A grant of use immunity
as such does not prohibit future prosecutions, since independent evidence which has
not been derived in any way from the witness's testimony may be used to prosecute
and convict him of the crime about which he has been questioned.
8. As used herein, "use immunity" includes protection against derivative use of
compelled testimony. Under this standard the prosecution is prohibited from using
evidence produced from leads derived from compelled testimony, in addition to being
foreclosed from introducing the compelled testimony in a subsequent prosecution
against the witness.
9. The statute under consideration was Rev. Stat. tit. XIII, ch. 17, § 860
(2d ed. 1878) (repealed 1910), amending Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, § 1, 15 Stat. 37,
which provided:
No pleading of a party, nor any discovery or evidence obtained from a party
or witness by means of a judicial proceeding in this or any foreign country,
shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against him or his property
or estate, in any court of the United States, in any criminal proceeding, or for the
enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture....
10. 142 U.S. 547 (1892). This case is credited with first enunciating transactional
immunity as the constitutional requirement for an immunity statute. The Counselman
litigation was the result of an investigation by a United States grand jury in the
Northern District of Illinois of violations of the Interstate Commerce Act.
11. 142 U.S. at 585-86.
12. While Counselman's adoption of the transactional immunity standard was
arguably dicta, since the statute under consideration in that case did not even provide
full use immunity as that standard has been defined, the Court reaffirmed its
adherence to the transactional immunity standard four years later in upholding a
statute which was drafted in response to Counselman. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591
(1896). That statute granted transactional immunity in exchange for testimony in
proceedings before the I.C.C. Subsequent federal statutes were drafted to provide
transactional immunity. See Grant, Federalism and Self-Incrimination, 4 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 549, 553 (1957). The Court continued to affirm the constitutional necessity
of transactional immunity as late as 1956. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422
(1956).

19721

KASTIGAR

V. UNITED

STATES

through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Each
state was thus free to apply its own standard of immunity in compelling testimony. Moreover, under the separate sovereignty doctrine, 3
another jurisdiction was not bound by the immunity granted by the
jurisdiction which compelled the testimony. The privilege protected
the witness only against prosecution by the jurisdiction which compelled the testimony, 4 and no constitutional problems resulted from
the use of the testimony by another sovereignty in a prosecution of
the witness.1 5 The doctrine was based upon the theory that one sovereignty could not curtail the operations of another by its own acts.' 6
Thus, until 1964 transactional immunity was important only in determining the effect upon federal prosecutions of immunity given in
exchange for testimony compelled by federal officials.
The separate sovereignty doctrine was rejected by the Supreme
Court in 1964, when it decided Malloy v. Hogan 7 and Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission.' In Malloy, 9 the Court held that the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination was applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. As
13. For a discussion of the development of this doctrine see Comment, Federalism
and the Fifth: Configurations of Grants of Immunity, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rzv. 561, 568
(1965). Critics of this doctrine argued that it left the witness in a position where
he could be "whipsawed into incriminating himself under both state and federal law
even though there is a privilege against self-incrimination in the Constitution of each."
Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 385 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting). The doctrine
was also criticized on the ground that it had no basis in the prior case law. See
Grant, Federalism and Self-Incrimination, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 549 (1957).
14. See Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958) (holding that a witness
granted immunity by a state could not refuse to testify because of fear of federal
prosecution) ; United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931) (holding that protection
against state prosecution was not essential to the validity of federal immunity
statutes).
15. See Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944). An exception to the
doctrine was found where a federal immunity statute by its terms prohibited use of
the testimony by a state. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956) ; Adams
v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954). Congressional power to prohibit such use by the
states was found in the "necessary and proper" clause. 347 U.S. at 183.
16. See, e.g., Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
17. 378 U.S. 1 (1964), noted in 10 N.Y.L.F. 602 (1964) and 16 S.C.L. REv. 520
(1964).
18. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
19. Petitioner Malloy was called as a witness in an inquiry into alleged gambling
activities. He refused to answer on the grounds that those answers might tend to
incriminate him, and was held in contempt of court and sentenced to jail. The
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed the conviction, holding that the
privilege was not properly invoked. 150 Conn. 220, 187 A.2d 744 (1963). The court
dealt with the state privilege, and with the requirements imposed by the due process
clause, but did not feel bound by the fifth amendment as such.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXXlI

a result, the states were bound to the federal constitutional standard"
of the privilege against self-incrimination, and required to grant immunity if they wished to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege.
Then in Murphy, which was decided on the same day as Malloy, the
Court held for the first time that a grant of immunity by one jurisdiction might affect the conduct of other jurisdictions with respect to
prosecution of a witness compelled to testify.
In Murphy, the petitioners were adjudged guilty of contempt
for refusing to testify before the Waterfront Commission after they
had been granted immunity from prosecution under the laws of New
York and New Jersey. They contended that their answers might
incriminate them under federal law, to which the immunity grant
did not extend. The Court held that fear of possible federal prosecution presented a valid ground for invocation of the state privilege and
that "a state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which
may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials
in connection with a criminal prosecution against him."'" Thus, in
holding that the privilege afforded protection against the actions of
another jurisdiction, the Court also accepted use immunity as an
adequate standard for the first time. Since Murphy may be read to
imply that use immunity is coextensive with the privilege against selfincrimination, confusion thereafter arose as to whether its acceptance
of use immunity applied only to an inter-jurisdictional situation or
whether use immunity would be accepted as an adequate grant to
protect the privilege in the intra-jurisdictional case. 2
20. 378 U.S. at 10. Even prior to Malloy all states recognized some form of
the privilege. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (McNaughton

rev. 1961).

Some

states purported to apply the federal standard as well. See, e.g., Brown v. State,
233 Md. 288, 196 A.2d 614 (1964), which held that the Maryland constitutional provision against self-incrimination was in "pari materia" with the provisions of the
fifth amendment and should "receive a like construction." 233 Md. at 296, 196 A.2d
at 617.
21. 378 U.S. at 79. The Court noted that its holding would apply to all interjurisdictional situations as well as that specifically before it. 378 U.S. at 53 n.1,
22. While the holding in Murphy was confined to an inter-jurisdictional setting,
the language used implied that use immunity was an adequate replacement for the
privilege in either an inter-jurisdictional or intra-jurisdictional situation. Its narrow
statement of Counselman referred only to the use immunity portion of the holding
and made no reference to the transactional immunity standard adopted in that case.
See 378 U.S. at 78.
The confusion engendered by Murphy is illustrated by the results reached

by different courts in intra-jurisdictional situations after Murphy. Four courts held
that Murphy did not affect the holding of Counselman, and that transactional immunity
was still the constitutional standard in the intra-jurisdictional situation. See United
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During the past term, in Kastigar v. United States, the Court
was faced with the precise question of whether the transactional immunity standard enunciated in Counselman had been limited or overruled sub silentio in Murphy. The petitioners in Kastigar were subpoenaed to appear before a United States grand jury in the Central

District of California. The government obtained from the district
court an order directing petitioners to answer questions and produce
evidence before the grand jury under a grant of immunity conferred

pursuant to the immunity provisions2 3 of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970.24 The Act offers only use immunity, 2 and petitioners
States v. Cropper, 454 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1971) ; United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias,
449 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1971) ; In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1971) ; In re Kinoy,
326 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit upheld
the grant of use immunity in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C.
§ 6002 (1970), as adequate to supplant the privilege, Stewart v. United States, 440
F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971), and a like result was reached in Zicarelli v. New Jersey
Comm'n of Investigation, 55 N.J. 249, 261 A.2d 129 (1970), which dealt with a
similar state statute. For an excellent discussion of the possible implication of
Murphy see Note, Counselman, Malloy, Murphy, and the States' Power to Grant
Immunity, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 336, 340 (1966).
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1970) are the provisions relating to federal immunity
grants. The statute was originally introduced as the Federal Immunity of Witnesses
Act in both houses of Congress, H.R. 11157, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) ; S. 2122,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). It applies to all federal proceedings, and replaces over
fifty federal immunity statutes. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 4019-22. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination,
to testify or provide other information in a proceeding or ancillary to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses,
or a committee or a subcommittee of either House and the person presiding
over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this
part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of
his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information
compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived
from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness
in any criminal case....
24. Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified in scattered
sections of the United States Code). See generally Comment, Constitutional Problems
Presented by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 32 OHio ST. L.J. 618 (1971).
25. See note 23 supra. The desire of many Congressmen to restrict immunity
grants in light of their reading of Murphy is shown by the remarks of Representative
Poff in introducing the act. He stated that:
The act would make a substantial change in the legal effect of an immunity
grant. Present laws give the witness what has been called an 'immunity bath' that is, a defense to prosecution for any crime revealed or related to his
testimony. Under recent Supreme Court decisions it now appears that testimony
can be constitutionally compelled by restricting only its use, either directly as
evidence or as leads to evidence. . . . By giving the immunity grant only the
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contended that transactional immunity was constitutionally necessary.
Petitioners were found to be in civil contempt for their persistence in
refusing to answer the grand jury's questions, and the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed,26 holding that the use immunity grant
of the Organized Crime Control Act was coextensive with the constitutional privilege." The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari presented
it with the opportunity to resolve the question of which standard of
immunity is required by the privilege, and to end the confusion that
had existed in this area since Murphy.
The Court resolved the question by holding that use immunity,
as provided in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, is coextensive
with the requirements of the fifth amendment privilege. 28 Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, stated that "[t]ransactional immunity, which accords full immunity from prosecution for the offense
to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege," 29
and thus is not required because "[w]hile a grant of immunity must
afford protection commensurate with that afforded by the privilege,
it need not be broader. ' 3 0° Thus the Court, while claiming that its holding was at least "consistent with the conceptual basis of Counselman,"'
completed the constitutional adoption of use immunity which Murphy
began.
ALTERNATIVES BEFORE THE COURT

The decision in Kastigar effectively discarded an immunity standard which had been used for over sixty years. The standard chosen
by the Court was only one of three alternatives which might have been
adopted, and it is not clear that the choice reflected adequate consideration of the issues involved. The first alternative before the Court
was application of a transactional immunity standard in both intrajurisdictional and inter-jurisdictional situations. This choice was properly rejected since transactional immunity universally applied would
effect required by the Fifth Amendment, a State or the Federal Government will
be free to prosecute on independently obtained evidence.
115 CONG. REC. 11975 (1969).
26. Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
Kastigar v. United States, 402 U.S. 971 (1971).
27. Contra, United States v. Cropper, 454 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1971) ; United
States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1971) ;In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32
(7th Cir. 1971) ; In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
28. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). Justice Douglas
dissented, 406 U.S. at 462, as did Justice Marshall, 406 U.S. at 467.
29. 406 U.S. at 453.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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give the witness too broad an immunity grant. 2 The granting of
transactional immunity represents a conscious decision by the compelling jurisdiction to give up its power to prosecute in return for the
individual's testimony. This would present no problem if our system
of government involved only one sovereignty, but to permit one jurisdiction to make that decision for all other jurisdictions would severely
limit the independent police power of other jurisdictions. Such a choice
would provide a witness with an immunity bath; he would have complete amnesty from prosecution in all jurisdictions. Complete transactional immunity inter-jurisdictionally applied would have therefore
been a poor selection.
Another possible alternative is that of a dual standard, under
which the witness would be provided with transactional immunity
intra-jurisdictionally and immunity from use by any other jurisdiction.
The Court's failure to consider this alternative seems to indicate a
faulty conception of the scope of the fifth amendment privilege, and a
lack of recognition of the difference between the constitutional restraints upon the government which compels the testimony and those
upon other sovereignties. This error is based upon the construction of
the privilege which was adopted in Murphy. The Court in Murphy
interpreted the privilege to mean that the prohibition against compelling
a person to be a witness against himself "in any criminal case" included
a restriction upon government action in criminal proceedings in other
jurisdictions ;" thus, when one jurisdiction granted immunity in return
for testimony, other jurisdictions were prevented by the privilege itself
from using that testimony in subsequent prosecutions against the witness. If this interpretation is accepted, then it follows that there can be
only one standard of immunity which must be applied against both
the compelling jurisdiction and other jurisdictions since the same
privilege could not have two different meanings when applied to different sovereignties.
32. The words of the Constitution theoretically do not seem to require transactional immunity, since such a standard would apparently give the witness more
protection than does the fifth amendment privilege. An immunity grant is required to
give only the same protection as does the privilege. 406 U.S. at 449 n.24. The
privilege against self-incrimination requires only that a defendant not be forced to
be a witness against himself, and does not protect him from prosecution by use of
evidence gained from sources independent of the defendant's own testimony. Therefore
use immunity is commensurate with the strict scope of the privilege since in theory
it gives the witness the same degree of protection. However, the protection afforded
by a use immunity grant may be illusory, and transactional immunity may be
necessary to preserve the protection of the privilege. See notes 46-52 infra and
accompanying text.
33. 378 U.S. at 78.
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However, as Justice Harlan suggested in his concurring opinion
in Murphy,34 the imposition of a restriction upon a non-compelling
jurisdiction as a result of the privilege afforded by the compelling jurisdiction is not sound reasoning. No support can be found in the case
law prior to Murphy,5 or in logic for the proposition that a privilege
contained in the constitution of one sovereignty could be a restriction
upon the actions of another sovereignty except in instances of a superior
power. Any restriction upon use of compelled testimony by a noncompelling jurisdiction must be based not upon the privilege applicable
to the compelling jurisdiction but upon the restrictions imposed on
the non-compelling jurisdiction by the requirements of due process.5 6
Recognition of the fact that restrictions upon different sovereignties
with respect to prosecution of a witness who has been compelled to
testify by one of those sovereignties flow from different constitutional
checks upon governmental power would provide a logical constitutional
foundation for a dual standard.
The choice of a dual standard would be a more adequate synthesis
of prior case law, in addition to being better constitutional doctrine.
Kastigar's reliance on Murphy, a case arising in an inter-jurisdictional
setting, to support its reasoning in an intra-jurisdictional situation,"
34. 378 U.S. at 89-90. Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment, however,
because he thought that the Court should in the exercise of its supervisory powers
over the administration of federal criminal justice prohibit the federal government
from making use of testimony compelled by the state, since use of such testimony by
federal officials would violate the policies underlying the federal privilege. 378 U.S.
at 91.
35. See notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text.
The cases dealing with double jeopardy have consistently adhered to a
separate sovereignty doctrine. See Abbatte v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959)
(state prosecution does not bar subsequent federal prosecution for same acts);
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (federal prosecution does not bar state
prosecution for same acts).
36. Both the federal government and the states are barred from depriving persons
of liberty without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV. Due process is said to include those principles "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) ; Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
These requirements would be violated if a non-compelling jurisdiction made
use of testimony compelled by another jurisdiction in a prosecution of the witness.
Although the non-compelling jurisdiction is not bound by the privilege applicable
to the jurisdiction which compels the testimony, "the accusatorial system has become
a fundamental part of the fabric of our society." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 8, 10
(1964). Evasion of a principle that has become so fundamental seems to be a
violation of due process. Using the witness's own testimony to convict him would
be such an evasion.
37. The Court stated that "...
both the reasoning of the Court in Murphy
and the result reached compel the conclusion that use and derivative use immunity
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reflects its view that Counselman was overruled by Murphy." Such
a view is erroneous, 9 however, since Murphy dealt only with the effect
of a grant of immunity by one jurisdiction upon prosecutions by other
jurisdictions, and thus should not be read as providing any assistance
in deciding what standard the privilege imposes upon the compelling
jurisdiction.
In its attempt to reconcile its decision with that of Counselinan,
the majority in Kastigar relied upon the fact that the statute held inadequate in Counselman was a limited use statute. 40 Although it is
true that the Court in Counselman focused upon the fact that the statute
provided no immunity from derivative use, 4 ' it did not expressly or
implicitly accept use immunity as adequate. In fact, the Court stated:
We are clearly of opinion that no statute which leaves the party or
witness subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating
question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege
conferred by the Constitution of the United States . . . .In view
of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid,
must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the
offense to which the question relates.4 2
Therefore, Counselman and Kastigar do not seem to be as consistent
as the Court indicates.
The choice of a dual standard would have combined the principles
of the Murphy and Counselman decisions, leaving each operative in
the sphere in which it was originally applied.4 3 The dangers inherent in
the application of use immunity lead to the conclusion that transactional
immunity is necessary to secure to the witness the full protection of the
privilege applicable to the compelling jurisdiction.4 4 There would be
is constitutionally sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege."

406 U.S. at 458.
38. Justice Douglas suggested that such was the Court's view. 406 U.S. at 463
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
39. Id at 463-64.
40. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
41. 142 U.S. at 586.
42. Id. at 585-86.
43. See United States ex r21. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40, 44 (3d Cir. 1971),
adopting the dual standard because of the court's view that it would best combine
the distinct considerations underlying the Counselman and Murphy decisions.
44. The privilege's guarantee to the witness that he will not be compelled to be
a witness against himself might easily be evaded where prosecutorial officials are
already in possession of the incriminating testimony. See note 52 infra and accompanying text. For this reason, and because the compelling jurisdiction "has had an
opportunity to elect whether it will forego prosecuting the witness as a price worth
paying for his testimony," United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40, 44
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no infringement upon the independent police power of other jurisdictions since they would still be free to prosecute using sources other
than the compelled testimony. Imposition of use immunity on these
jurisdictions would also recognize the fact that due process may place
a less stringent restriction upon a non-compelling jurisdiction than the
45
privilege imposes upon a jurisdiction which compels testimony.
The Court did not consider such an alternative in Kastigar,
however, and chose instead to make use immunity the standard in
both the intra-jurisdictional and inter-jurisdictional situations. Such
a choice involves dangers which may easily lead to infringement of a
witness's constitutional right not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
THE CHOICE OF USE IMMUNITY

Use immunity as a standard for protection of the fifth amendment
privilege involves two important elements, both of which raise problems serious enough to suggest that perhaps the Court's choice of use
immunity as an adequate intra-jurisdictional standard was ill advised.4 6
First, Kastiqar's choice of use immunity represents the application of
the exclusionary rule of evidence in the immunity area ;47 compelled
(3d Cir. 1971), transactional immunity may properly be imposed upon that
jurisdiction.
It may be argued that the considerations which lead to a requirement of
transactional immunity in the intra-jurisdictional situation would also warrant
adoption of an equal standard in the inter-jurisdictional situation. In view of the
close cooperation of state and federal law enforcement officials it might be possible
for officials of non-compelling jurisdictions to obtain the testimony and make illicit
use thereof. Hofstadter and Levittan, Immunity and the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination - Too Little and Too Much, 39 N.Y.S.B.J. 105, 111 (1967). While
this danger exists, it seems to be more remote than the dangers of illicit use by the
compelling jurisdiction, since officials of other jurisdictions do not have immediate
access to the incriminating information. This problem does not seem to be sufficiently
serious to require transactional immunity inter-jurisdictionally, particularly in light
of the infringement upon the power of the non-compelling jurisdiction which would
result from transactional immunity.
45. Due process requires, inter alia, fundamental fairness. Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952). Fundamental fairness does not seem to require that a witness
be given absolute immunity in all jurisdictions because he is compelled to testify
in one. The test of fundamental fairness would be met if the witness is not prejudiced in other jurisdictions by what he is compelled to do in one jurisdiction.
46. These problems were analyzed by Justice Marshall in his dissent. 406 U.S.
at 467. He argued that transactional immunity is necessary to provide a reliable
guarantee that the testimony will not be used against the witness. 406 U.S. at 471.
47. The Court stated that "[t]he statutory proscription is analogous to the
Fifth Amendment requirement in cases of coerced confessions." 406 U.S. at 461.
It also noted with approval the conclusions of the National Commission on Reform
of Federal Criminal Laws that the immunity with respect to compelled testimony
should be of a level equal to that applied with respect to fruits of illegal searches,
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testimony will be excluded from subsequent prosecutions in the same
mariner as items of evidence resulting from an illegal search and
seizure. While there is some merit to the Court's conclusion that exclusion of compelled testimony from further use in prosecution leaves
the witness in the same position as if he had not testified at all,4" the
application of the exclusionary rule in the immunity area does not fit
quite so neatly. In the search and seizure, coerced confession, and right
to counsel cases, the rule involves merely removing pieces of evidence
from the court's consideration, while in the immunity area the problem
is one of maintaining the individual's right not to incriminate himself.49 The exclusionary rule is a remedial device, designed to "provide
a partial and inadequate remedy" to victims of unconstitutional infringement, which does not "purge the conduct of its unconstitutional
character." 50 On the other hand, the purpose of an immunity standard
is to provide an advance framework by which prosecutorial officials
can measure their conduct. The exclusion of evidence has heretofore
been a tool used only when such officials mistakenly exceeded their
bounds, and such a remedial device seems misplaced if an immunity
standard is initially to satisfy the scope of the privilege against selfincrimination. The Court's adoption of the exclusionary rule seems
certain to lead to confusing retrospective inquiries as to whether illicit
use of compelled testimony was made, instead of providing a clear cut
guide for prosecutorial actions.
The burden of proof problems which are inherent in these inquiries further illustrate the difficulties of use immunity. Transactional
immunity precludes any burden of proof problem, since the compelled
witness must prove only that he had received an earlier grant of immunity in exchange for testimony that relates to the immediate prosecution. A use immunity standard involves proving that no use of the
testimony was made in the subsequent prosecution of a compelled witness. While the Court asserts that the burden is placed on the prosecution to prove that it has made no use of the compelled testimony, the
practical application of this standard is not clear.
evidence gathered in violation of the right to counsel and coerced confessions. 406
U.S. at 452 n.36. See also Comment, Federalism and the Fifth: Configurations of
Grants of Immunity, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 561 (1957).
48. See note 32 supra.
49. See Hofstadter and Levittan, Immunity and the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination - Too Little and Too Much, 39 N.Y.S.B.J. 105, 111 (1967). The
authors state that where immunity statutes are concerned, "it is no longer a
question of invoking an exclusionary rule as a mere matter of deterrence, but
rather one of keeping or making a defendant whole."
50. 406 U.S. at 470 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The majority in Kastigar stated that the prosecution's "burden of
proof . . . is not limited to a negation of taint; rather, it imposes on
the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of
the compelled testimony."'" However it is questionable whether the
prosecution really bears such a burden. There is without question a
possibility of secret misuse of compelled testimony, since there is no
great difficulty in finding sources "wholly independent" for a conclusion already reached from the leads of compelled testimony.5 2 Once
an independent source is found, the burden will shift to the defendant
who then must prove that illicit use was made of the testimony, and
that the prosecution against him was the result of such illicit use.
It is here that Kastigar's formulation of use immunity seems to
be most questionable. The task of proving that evidence offered is
the result of illicit use of compelled testimony is an impossible burden
on a defendant. In an intra-jurisdictional situation, the testimony is in
the hands of the officials, and the defendant would be forced to trace the
investigatory processes of the prosecution. No defendant is in a position to pierce the law enforcement process and prove to a court that
illicit use was made of his testimony. The Court therefore seems to
place a burden on the witness which he is incapable of sustaining.
While these problems do not necessarily invalidate the Court's
constitutional sanctioning of use immunity, they seemingly would
justify maintaining use immunity in the narrow perspective in which
it was applied in Murphy. The possibility of evasion of fifth amendment rights is not adequately answered by the Court's formula, and
thus transactional immunity should have been retained at least in the
intra-jurisdictional setting.
Although the Court did not select the best alternative it did put
an end to the uncertainty created by Malloy and Murphy. In light of
its resolution in favor of the use immunity standard it is now possible
for Maryland to revamp its immunity structure.
POSSIBILITIES

FOR CHANGE IN

MARYLAND

The Kastigar decision does not directly apply to Maryland, because the Court was faced only with the question of the constitutionality of a federal statute arising in a federal prosecution. However,
51. 406 U.S. at 460.
52. See Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 568 (1971)

(Brennan, J.,
dissent-

ing) ; United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1971)
C.J., concurring).

(Seitz,
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the Kastigar holding was made directly applicable to state immunity
grants through the Court's companion decision in Zicarelli v. Investigation Commission of New Jersey.5" Argued and decided in conjunction with Kastigar, Zicarelli involved the constitutionality of the New
Jersey immunity statute granting use immunity. In upholding that
statute, the Court followed its opinion in Kastigar and ruled that state
immunity statutes need only grant use immunity to be constitutionally
co-extensive with the privilege against self-incrimination.
An analysis of the numerous Maryland statutes which involve
grants of immunity indicates that the great majority presently grant
transactional immunity in exchange for compelled testimony.54 In the
midst of the past confusion in the immunity area, the Maryland position has been to uphold transactional immunity, 55 without venturing
into the intricacies of whether it was constitutionally necessary. In
Roll v. State,56 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, upholding a
transactional immunity statute, reflected that "[h]opefully the Supreme
'5 7
Court will shed some light on the question in the near future.
Kastigar has shed such light, and those statutes granting transactional
immunity now afford broader protection than is constitutionally mandated. The dangers which accompany adoption of a use immunity
standard might warrant retention of transactional immunity by Maryland. However, it is doubtful that legislators and prosecuting authorities would favor the stricter standard in light of considerations of
effective law enforcement.
53. 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
54. The following Maryland statutes presently grant transactional immunity:
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 23 (Supp. 1972) (bribery of public officials) ; MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 24 (1971)
(bribery in athletic contests) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 39 (1971) (conspiracy to bribe, gaming, lotteries) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 262
(1971) (gaming) ; MD.ANN. CODE art. 27, § 298(c) (1971)
(health - controlled
dangerous substances) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 371 (1971)
(lotteries) ; MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 540 (Supp. 1972) (sabotage) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 40, § 45 (1971)
(Commission on Judicial Disabilities) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 28 (1972)
(insurance commissioner) ; MD.ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 12(j) (1969) (unemployment
insurance laws) ; MD.ANN. CODE art. 101, § 8(c) (1964) (workmen's compensation
commission).
The following statutes and procedural rules currently contain grants of use
immunity: MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 400 (1971) (sale of liquor to minors); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 33, § 26-19 (1971) (elections) ; MD.ANN. CODE art. 75, § 74 (1969)
(enforcement of judgments) ; MD.ANN. CODE art. 81, § 359 (1969) (hearings before
Comptroller) ; Md. R.P. 628c (examination of judgment debtor).
55. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 233 Md. 288, 196 A.2d 614 (1964), upholding
the transactional immunity grant in MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 23 (Supp. 1972),
with respect to testimony compelled in connection with bribery,
56. 15 Md. App. 31, 288 A.2d 605 (1972).
57. 15 Md. App. at 38, 288 A.2d at 609.
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The Court's choice of use immunity has been well received by
prosecuting authorities throughout the state. Application of the transactional immunity standard in Maryland causes problems, since a
unique feature of the Maryland criminal justice system is the independence of the individual State's Attorneys in granting immunity to
compel testimony.5 8 Thus, the effect of transactional immunity in Maryland is to give the compelled witness an immunity bath throughout
the state, since the grant of immunity by one State's Attorney completely bars subsequent prosecution by another.
This problem was a definite consideration in the minds of the
State's Attorneys and the Attorney General's office when the Attorney
General's "organized crime package" was introduced before the 1972
session of the Maryland General Assembly. The proposed legislation
included a bill, introduced in both the Senate and the House of Delegates, which would have granted use immunity in exchange for compelled testimony,5 9 thus putting an end to the immunity bath problem.
The bill was referred to committee in both houses, but received unfavorable reports.6" In light of Kastigar there is likely to be reconsideration of such legislation by the General Assembly at its next
session. It is suggested that any statute adopting use immunity for
compelled testimony should be modeled upon the New Jersey statute
upheld in Zicarelli. Such careful draftsmanship can serve to obviate
some of the dangers of use immunity.
New Jersey's immunity statute, 6' which grants use immunity,
requires that the witness be given advance notice of the subject of the
inquiry at which he may be compelled to testify. 62 In addition, the
witness has the right to have counsel present.0 3 The Maryland bill
proposed at the 1972 legislative session included such an advance notice
provision, and it seems prudent to add a right to counsel provision.
A key provision of the New Jersey statute is the "responsiveness"
limitation, pursuant to which the compelled witness is immune only
from the use of "responsive" testimony.6 4 The Zicarelli Court rejected the contention that such a limitation was unconstitutionally
58. While most of the Maryland immunity statutes do not specifically state
who is responsible for granting immunity they do speak in terms of being compelled
to testify in court or before a grand jury, both of which proceedings are conducted
by the State's Attorney. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 23 (Supp. 1972).
59. S.B. 541, Md. Gen. Assembly (1972); H.B. 838, Md. Gen. Assembly (1972).
60. Id.
61. N.J. REV. STAT. § 52: 9M-17(a) (Supp. 1970).
62. N.J. REV. STAT. § 52: 13E-2 (Supp. 1970).
63. N.J. REV. STAT. § 52: 13E-3 (Supp. 1970).
64. N.J. REV. STAT. § 52: 9M-17(b) (Supp. 1970).
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vague, noting that it served as "a barrier to those who would intentionally tender information not sought in an effort to frustrate . . .
criminal prosecution." 6' Use immunity by itself does not necessarily
preclude the problem of the witness gaining an immunity bath. A
compelled witness may still gain "undue protection by volunteering
what -the State already knows or will likely come upon without the
witness's aid." 66 Such a limitation seems desirable to prevent a potential immunity bath problem.
In addition, the statute should incorporate a present feature of
the federal immunity grant statute,6 7 which will lessen the possibility
of immunity baths. Under the federal system the Attorney General
must approve all orders compelling a witness to testify over a claim of
the privilege, 68 except in the case of immunity grants in connection
with proceedings before Congress.6" This provision could be incorporated into the Maryland statute by provision for an investigative
commission in the Attorney General's office which would have the
sole authority to grant immunity in exchange for testimony.
Such a system would alleviate any potential immunity bath problem, since the decision to grant immunity would be made by one
central body. This body would have a perspective not possessed by
any individual State's Attorney, to balance the state's interest in prosecuting against the desirability of obtaining the testimony and consequently guard against excessive immunity grants.
65. 406 U.S. at 477.
66. Zicarelli v. New Jersey Comm'n of Investigation, 55 N.J. 249, 261 A.2d 129,
140 (1970).
67. See note 23 supra.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1970) provides that a United States attorney may, with
the approval of the Attorney General, request an order to compel a witness who
has been or may be called to testify at a proceeding before a court or grand jury
of the United States to testify over a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination.
18 U.S.C. § 6004 (1970) provides that an agency of the United States may, with
the approval of the Attorney General, issue such an order in any proceeding before
the agency. Both sections provide that an official may issue such an order when,
in his judgment, "the testimony or other information from such individual may be
necessary to the public interest." 18 U.S.C. §§ 6603(b) (1), 6004(b) (1)
(1970).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 6005 (1970) does not provide that approval of the Attorney
General is necessary. Under section 6005, district courts are to issue orders
compelling testimony where the request for the order is approved by two-thirds
of the committee, if the proceeding is before a congressional committee, or by a
majority of the House of Congress before whom the proceeding is had. However, it is
necessary to show that the Attorney General has been served with notice of
intention to request the order. 18 U.S.C. § 6005(b) (3) (1970). Furthermore, the
court may defer the issuance of the order for up to twenty days on the requests of the
Attorney General. 18 U.S.C. § 6005(c) (1970). Thus, while the Attorney General is
not empowered to prevent Congress from granting immunity, he will have notice of all
congressional immunity grants. This fact is consistent with the central source concept.
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Although the concept of a central authority has much to recommend it from the state's point of view, it seems to do little to ameliorate
the problems raised for the defendant by the Kastigar standard. The
burden of proving that illicit use was made of the compelled testimony
is an equally heavy imposition upon the defendant with or without the
central authority. Once such an authority granted immunity and gave
the testimony to the individual State's Attorney for use in an investigation it would have no control over the use that was made of the
testimony; the individuals in the offices of the State's Attorneys would
have the same opportunities to misuse the testimony that they have
under the present system. The possibilities of illicit use of testimony
are not attributable to any particular form of administration but are
endemic to any system which accepts the use immunity standard. In
essence such a standard leaves "the witness 'dependent for the preservation of his rights upon the integrity and good faith of the prosecuting authorities.' "70
CONCLUSION

The Kastigar decision resolved the long debate over the scope of
immunity required by the Constitution to supplant the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In selecting use immunity,
the Supreme Court established a standard which allows greater flexibility on the part of the prosecutor, yet undermines the protection of
the compelled witness. While Kastigar's choice of use immunity is
arguably constitutionally correct, it appears that the problems inherent
in use immunity and the existence of a viable alternative would have
justified keeping use immunity in the narrow perspective in which
Murphy originally applied it.
Nevertheless, now that use immunity has been established as the
standard constitutionally required of immunity statutes, there is clearly
a need for the uniform restructuring of such statutes in Maryland.
The numerous Maryland statutes that presently grant transactional
immunity in exchange for compelled testimony have resulted in the
problem of immunity baths, and are, in fact, no longer constitutionally
mandated. These statutes could be revised in light of the federal
experience with a central authority but should be carefully drafted to
provide safeguards against misuse by the prosecutor. Even with the
most careful draftsmanship it is doubtful that the exchange of use
immunity for compelled testimony is a fair exchange for the accused.
70. 406 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

